Davis v. Bandemer by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
lfp/ss 10/04/85 BAND SALLY-POW 
84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer (Indiana Reapportionment) 
Findings of the Three-Judge DC: 
l. The legislative process: Republicans control -
both Houses: bills introduced "were blank", in effect, the 
purpose being to refer bills to a conference committee: 
all conferees were Republicans: four Democratic "advisers" 
were given no access to the map-making process: 
2. Computer firm. Paid $250, 000 by Republican 
state committee, and "no minority party members had access 
to the computer information". 
3. The Republican plan was introduced the last 
week of the regular session. The DC noted that the 
Republican majority "felt insula ted from challenge merely 
by adherence to the one-man-one-vote principle", applied 
by a computer. 
4. Par tis an purpose only. When the Speaker of 
the House was asked for the reasons the plan was proposed, 
replied: "Political 
--,. 
Republicans as possible". 
we wanted to save~~ent 
;'\ 
5. "Stacking" of Democrats into districts they 
would carry in any event. 
2. 
6. Community of interest.1. The DC found: "A 
lack of any consistent application of 'community of 
interest' principles". See Marrion County. See 
particularly districts 48 and 66. 
7. DC found many districts "contorted", with no -------
consideration of "compactness". 
8. "Splitting" of Democratic vote to give 
Republicans a majority. 
9. Multi-member districts. The court "found 
that the disadvantaging effect of the plan's multi-member 
districts falls particularly hard and harsh upon black 
voters in the state". See A-18. 
~
10. Stacking of blacks into large majority 
districts. 
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October 9, 1985 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 84-1244, Davis v. Bandemer 
In Karcher v. Daggett, 462 u.s. 725 (1983), the DC's 
opinion contained no findings of fact similar to the findings 
made by the DC in this case. See Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 
F.Supp. 978 (D.N.J. 1982). From the DC's opinion in Karcher, the 
challenge to the New Jersey congressional reapportionment plan 
appears to have been based solely on the "one man, one vote" 
guarantee embodied in Art. I, § 2 of the Constitution. With 
respect to the plaintiff's showing, the DC found that the plan 
adopted by the legislature had a population deviation of .6984 %. 
That deviation was not "unavoidable" because other plans with 
smaller deviations had been introduced. The DC then considered 
whether population deviations were justified by legitimate 
legislative goals. The DC did refer to statements by legislative 
leaders concerning the criteria they followed in adopting the 
plan. The leaders claimed in deposition testimony that they 
sought to adhere to "one man, one vote," to protect minority 
interests, to preserve the cores of pre-existing districts and 
municipal lines, and to preserve the influence of Democratic 
incumbents. In deciding if the deviations were justified, the DC 
focused only on the goal of preserving minority interests and of 
anticipating population shifts, and concluded that these goals 
did not explain the deviations. The majority opinion in Karcher 
states that the only justification pressed by the State was the 
~- ~-·----~~~-----------------
goal of preserving minority voting strength. 
------------~~--~----~~ 
In sum, from the opinions in Karcher, the DC made no I 
findings with respect to the factors considered in this case: 
~ ~·-~-·-
(1) While referring to the fact that partisan goals 
influenced adoption of the plan, the DC in Karcher made no 
finding with respect to the legislative process leading up to 
adoption of the plan and whether that process was designed to 
exclude one political group. (Justice Stevens' opinion in 
Karcher observes that the legislative process was not neutral, 
but that statement was not supported by a finding of the DC). 
Obviously, partisan goals will always play a role in a 
reapportionment process: but such goals do not seem to justify 
the total exclusion of Democrats from the legislative process 
that occurred in this case. Moreover, based on an observation in 
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Karcher, it appears that 
there was some evidence in Karcher of legitimate legislative 
goals beyond "one man, one vote." Here, on the other hand, the 
DC found that the plan was motivated only by partisan goals 
through adherence to "one man, one vote." The DC indicated that 
other goals advanced by the legislature were pretextual. 
(2) The DC in Karcher made no findings with respect to 
the bizarre map. Of course, the map spoke for itself. But the -record in this case is stronger for the DC specifically referred 
to the map and explained why some of the bizarre district shapes 
were likely to lead to voter confusion. In connection with the 
shapes of the districts in this case, the DC discussed lack of 
compactness, failure to adhere to county lines, and disregard of 
community of interest. 
(3) Karcher contained no finding concerning unexplained 
~
and inconsistent use of multi-member districts. - --
(4) Karcher contained no finding concerning the 
r-- --
relationship between votes cast for candidates of a particular 
party and the number of such candidates actually elected. 
Finally, I do not find the "flood of litigation" arguments 
at all convincing. It seems to me that the Karcher analysis is 
far more likely to produce a flood of litigation than would the 
equal protection analysis advanced here. Under Karcher, a plan 
can be challenged on the basis of any population deviation, no 
matter how small. Then the State is required to come forward and 
show that the deviation is justified on some neutral objective. 
Here, the plaintiff's burden is much tougher to meet. The 
plaintiff must make a strong prima facie showing of 
discrimination before the State is required to point to neutral 
criteria. In other words, I think that the equal protection 
claim here is more susceptible to dismissal at the pleading stage 
or at the summary judgment stage than is a Karcher claim. 
No. 84-1244 , Da~is-v. Ba~m  ~ ~ Conf. 10/9/85 
ur--., 4= ? 71~ ::....., pz..~ 
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MEMORANDUM 
'1'0: Anne DA'l'E: January 2, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer 
1 read your first draft (November 19) of a 
dissent in this case some time ago, and should have 
commented on it. As 
Court opinion any day, 
it. 
1 rather expected Justice White 1 s 
1 thought perhaps 1 should await 
In quiet of New Year 1 s Day, I took the occasion 
to take a second look at your draft believing that 
Justice White cannot delay his opinion much longer. In 
general, despite considerable editing that may or may not 
be improvement, I think your draft substantively is 
excellent. Although I suggest that we defer further work 
on it until we see the Court opinion, I make the following 
comments at this time: 
1. Probably the first paragraph in the dissent 
will require some revision. 





My guess is that 
justiciability of 
Justice White will not 
dispute an equal protection 
challenge to a reapportionment plan. 
this respect, we can omit Part II 
possibly simply add a footnote 
justiciability of this type of case. 
If I am correct in 
of our draft, and 
reaffirming the 
4. Do we need to add a note saying that black 
voters also challenged the apportionment plan, but are no 
longer parties distinct from Democrats? I do not have in 
mind exactly why the black groups did not appeal 
separately. 
5. Part Ill (probably to be Part II), pp. 7-12, 
is quite good. I have done a fair amount of stylistic 
editing, but the substance of your draft - and the use of 
authorities is persuasive. Reynolds v. Sims is 
particularly helpful. Are there any subsequent cases that 
reiterate what the Court said in that case with respect to 
the relevance of criteria other than "one man one vote"? 
6. I suggest, at least tentatively, that we omit 
the full paragraph on p. 12. Something along these lines 
probably can be best said at or near the end of our 
dissent after we see what the Court says. 
.:>. 
7. Part IV (probably will be Ill), beginning on 
p. 13 also is well written. I do suggest that we limit 
this to pages 13 to end at the top of page 17. What is 
said in these pages applies to the entire reapportionment 
plan, and focuses primarily on the procedure - the grossly 
partisan procedure by which the plan was adopted. 
8. It seems to me, Anne, that we then should 
have two separate Roman numeral parts, one dealing with 
the effect of the plan on House Districts, and the second 
with the effect of the plan on Senate Districts. As I 
read the draft, pages 17-through the first half of page 
21, deal solely with House Districts - and you have done 
this very effectively. 
9. I had expected that what we might call Part 
IV, beginning on page 21, would address the effect of the 
plan on Senate Districts as you did the House Districts -
selecting only the two or three worst. Rather, if I read 
the draft correctly, the only separate treatment of the 
Senate portion of the plan is inclusion the result of the 
two elections of 1982 and 1984. This is helpful, but my 
recollection is that although the gerrymandering of Senate 
Districts was not as widespread as the House Districts, 
there were at least some Senate Districts that merit our 
'So 
attention. Justice White - in addition to Justice Stevens 
- agreed that one of the Senate Districts was a gross 
example of gerrymandering. 
When we see the Court opinion we will have a 
better idea how to deal with the Senate apportionment. 
This should be in a separate Part of our opinion as it may 
attract the vote of a Justice who otherwise goes along 
with the remainder of the apportionment. 
10. The discussion commencing with the first 
full paragraph on 22 and going to the end of the draft 
contains some time points. These deal generally with the 
entire plan and could be included in a separate final Part 
of our dissent. 
11. A few miscellaneous observations: When 
stating what the DC "found", where there is particularly 
helpful language it might be well to quote it - probably 
in notes. Also some citations to what the DC found may be 
desirable. 
12. At the appropriate place we should repeat 
that the DC's findings of fact must be accepted unless the 
Court finds they are clearly erroneous. In this 
connection, Anne, my guess is that what is written in the 
Thornton case as to acceptance of the DC' s findings will 
.Jo 
be helpful to us in this case. we should keep this in 
mind, and perhaps try to arrange for the two cases to come 
down together. Of course, Thornton is a racial case, but 
as to acceptance of the DC's findings the cases are 
analogous. 
13. In our final section we might quote the 
dictionary definition of "gerrymandering"(to divide a 
state, county, or city into voting districts to give 
"unfair advantage" to one party in elections). In 
addition, as you have said and as Justice White certainly 
will emphasize that courts traditionally have accorded 
substantial deference even to gerrymandering decisions by 
legislative bodies. Despite this deference, and perhaps a 
presumption of validity of legislative action, courts have 
not hesitated to review - even with heightened scrutiny -
plans that appear to discriminate against minorities. In 
a given state at a particular time, members of a 
particular party may constitute a "minority" on the basis 
of registration or voting patterns. The justiciability of 
non-racial cases is well established, and therefore 
despite the deference owed the political processes of the 
legislative branch, we have a duty to enforce the Equal 
., 
o. 
Protection Clause (Reynolds made this explicit), and this 
is a particularly egregious example of its violation. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
January 13 , 1986 
84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer 
Dear Byron: 
In due tirnn I will circulate a dissenting view. 
Just i C'? ~Jl-t i. te 
lfp/ss 
cc : The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBER S OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CO NN O R 
.ittllrttttt Qfltltri cf tq t ~ttitdt .§tab~ 
'Jluftingtctt, ~. <!f. 2llp'!~ 
January 15, 1986 ' 
Re: 84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer 
Dear Byron, 
My vote at Conference was to reverse either 
on the grounds that political gerrymandering claims 
are nonjusticiable or on the grounds that the 
apportionment scheme at issue in this case survives a 
highly deferential rational basis scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause. On reflection, and with the 
benefit of your helpful Memorandum, I am now inclined 
to think political gerrymandering claims should be 
held to be nonjusticiable because I do not think the 
Equal Protection Clause supplies any judicially 
manageable standard in this context. 
Many of the reasons you offer for requiring 
plaintiffs bringing a political gerrymandering claim 
to make a threshold showing of serious effects 
requiring intervention by a federal court seem to me 
equally applicable to the prior question whether such 
claims are justiciable. Certainly this is so of your 
observation that it would be unwise to "embroil the 
judiciary in what has consistently been referred to as 
a political task for the legislature." Memorandum, at 
19. The presumption you suggest that elected 
candidates will not ignore the interests of voters for 
the losing candidate, and your assertion that "the 
power to influence the political process is not 
limited to winning elections," Memorandum, at 17-18, 
support the view that political gerrymandering should 
not be seen as causing intolerable harm to the ability 
of political groups to advance their interests. As 
you note, we tolerate equivalent disproportionalities 
between a political group's voting strength and its 
direct representation in the legislature when caused 
by district-wide election systems • . And once it is 
conceded that "a group's electoral power is not 
unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an 
apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more 
difficult," Memorandum at 18, it seems to me that the 
virtual impossibility of reliably distinguishing 
between degrees of difficulty in winning elections 
cuts in favor of holding such chall~nges 
nonjusticiable. Moreover, I see no basis for treating 
supposed diminution of the statewide voting influence 
of a political group as constitutionally cognizable 
when a scheme that tended to "deny safe district 
minorities any realistic chance to elect their own 
representatives," Memorandum at 17, was upheld in 
Gaffney. Although Gaffney treated a political 
gerrymandering claim as JUsticiable, the opinion's 
observation that "districting inevitably has and is 
intended to have substantial political consequences," 
412 U.S., at 753, and its reluctance to undertake "the 
impossible task of extirpating politics from what are 
the essentially political processes of the sovereign 
States," id., at 754, would equally support a holding 
that whatever harms political gerrymandering may 
sometimes occasion are inextricably associated with 
the business of redistricting. Legislative 
redistricting thus yields ·a variety of real benefits 
but it cannot be subjected to judicial supervision 
without great cost. 
The standard you propose exemplifies the 
intractable difficulty in deriving a judicially 
manageable standard from the Equal Protection Clause. 
I know of no way to measure "a voter's or a group of 
voters' influence on the political process as a 
whole." Memorandum, at 18. To allow district courts 
to strike down apportionment plans on the basis of 
their prognostications as to the outcome of future 
elections or future apportionments invites "findings" 
on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone else 
can have any confidence. You reject proportionality 
between voting strength and electoral outcomes as a 
standard, but it seems to me all but inevitable that 
courts will look for "undue" disproportionality or the 
like if political gerrymandering claims are 
justiciable. 
It seems to me these difficulties, and the 
even greater ones that would attend any imposition of 
supposedly neutral criteria on legislative choices as 
to apportionment, justify treating . the vote dilution 
claims of mainstream political groups as 
nonjusticiable. Where a racial minority challenges an 
apportionment scheme, the stronger nexus between 
individual rights and group interests, and the greater 
warrant the Equal Protection Clause gives the federal 
courts to intervene for protection against racial 
discrimination, suffice to render such claims 
justiciable. As does your Memorandum, I would leave 
our current doctrine with respect to such challenges 
undisturbed. But to allow the proliferation of vote 
dilution claims by mainstream political groups would 
essentially be "to conclude that political groups 
themselves have an independent constitutional claim to 
representation." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 u.s. 55, 79 
( 1980) (plurality ·op1n 1on) . S 1nce I see no manageable 
way of conferring such a right on the very political 
groups that have shaped apportionment throughout our 
history, I am inclined to believe that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not compel treating political 
gerrymandering claims as justiciable. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMeERS 01" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.llUFtUU OfotU"t of tlrt ~b .l\fatte 
11htelfinghtn. ~. <If. 2ll~'l-~ 
Re: No. 84-1244-Davis v. Bandemer 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
( 




.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Byron, 
January 16, 1986 ·/ 
No. 84-1244 
Davis v. Bandemer 
Although at Conference I rested on 
a different ground, I find your 
memorandum most persuasive, and if it 
becomes a Court opinion please join me. 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
jlupl"mu QI~turi &rf tift ,.nit.tb jltatts 
)tulfbtghm. ~. QI. 2C~'Ir~ 
January 17, 1986 
Re: 84-1244 - Davis v. Bandemer 
Dear Byron: 
Although I agree with a good deal of what ycu 
have written in your memorandum, I shall wait for 
Lewis' writing. 
In general I agree with your view that claims of 
this kind are justiciable and that they should have 
to surmount a fairly substantial threshold. As you 
may surmise, however, I am inclined to think that the 
standards that I discussed in my separate writing in 
Karcher v. Daggett, may be more manageable than the 
~effects• approach that your memorandum seems to 
endorse. 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iuprtutt (!fomiltf tlft ~tb .italts 
··hts!pnghnt. ~. <ij. 2llgt,.~ 
January 27, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer 
Dear Byron, 
I 
As I told both you and Sandra earlier, after reading 
your respective circulations, I agree with Sandra's idea 
that claims of political gerrymandering, at least when 





cc: The Conference 
January 29, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
84-1244 Davis v. Bandemer 
In the New Jersey r~apportionment case, Karcher v. 
Daggett {1983), we agreed that an understanding of the is-
sues would be facilitated by reproducing in color the maps 
of the new districts. 
We have a similar problem in Bandemere. Without the 
reproduction of the maps in color it is quite difficult to 
understand this case. I do not recall whether this is a 
decision for the Chief Justice, the Conference or whether -
if a majority of you agree - the r~port~r can b~ req,Jcsted 
to make the necessarv arrangements. 
LFP, JR. 
LFP/vde 
cc - Reporters Office 
i ... 
